Private Law: Criminal Law by Bennett, Dale E.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 12 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1950-1951 Term
January 1952
Private Law: Criminal Law
Dale E. Bennett
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Dale E. Bennett, Private Law: Criminal Law, 12 La. L. Rev. (1952)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol12/iss2/3
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
CRIMINAL LAW
Dale E. Bennett*
In State v. Mathe' the appeal was from a conviction of
indecent behavior with juveniles. The defendant sought to have
his conviction set aside on the ground that the repeal of the
Criminal Code,2 incidental to its incorporation in the Louisiana
Revised Statutes as Chapter 1 of Title 14, "acted as a legislative
pardon for all offenses committed before and not tried prior to its
effective date of May 1, 1950." 3 The Louisiana Supreme Court
squarely rejected this argument, and Justice LeBlanc's opinion
accurately states the true nature and effect of the Revised Stat-
utes. Justice LeBlanc first examined the general legislative man-
date under which the projet of the statutes had been prepared
by the Law Institute and then looked at the title of the act adopt-
ing the Revised Statutes. These significant criteria of legislative
intent clearly indicated that the original statutory provisions,
except as necessarily modified to remove incongruities and to
organize them according to a logical pattern, were carried for-
ward and continued in effect in the Revised Statutes. Turning
more directly to the Criminal Code, Justice LeBlanc emphasized
the fact that the code had been incorporated in the Revised Stat-
utes in its entirety. Relying on a well-settled rule of construc-
tion of revised statutes, he then declared, "There was no inter-
ruption in the existence of this Code, as the re-adoption and
re-enactment of all of its provisions came simultaneously with
the repeal of the former Act under which it existed; the reaffirm-
ance of the law as it existed had the effect of counteracting the
repeal." 4
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 219 La. 661, 53 So. 2d 802 (1951).
2. La. Act 43 of 1942.
3. 53 So. 2d 802, 804 (La. 1951). Certain alleged trial irregularities, upon
which defense counsel had intended to rely, were unavailable because of a
failure to perfect the bills of exceptions relative thereto. Similarly, defense
counsel had failed to take any bill of exception to the overruling of his motion
for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, and this issue
was not reviewable on appeal.
4. 53 So. 2d 802, 805. In so holding, Justice LeBlanc quoted from 50 Am.
Jur. Stat. § 555, that ". . . the rule of construction applicable to acts which
revise and consolidate other acts is, that when the revised and consolidated
act re-enacts in the same or substantially the same terms the provisions of
the act or acts so revised and consolidated, the revision and consolidation
shall be taken to be a continuation of the former act or acts, although the
former act or acts may be expressly repealed by the revised and consolidated
act; and all rights and liabilities under the former act or acts are preserved
and may be enforced." This view is also nicely and clearly stated in State v.
Prouty, 115 Iowa 657, 80 N.W. 670 (1900).
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Additional and specific evidence of the all-important legis-
lative intent was found in the general provision of Section 16
of Title 1 (the introductory title) of the Revised Statutes, which
declared "the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 shall be con-
strued as continuations of and as substitutes for the laws or parts
of laws which are revised and consolidated herein." Then in
order to make sure that the rights and penalties incurred prior to
the effective date of the Revised Statutes would be fully pre-
served, Section 16 concluded, "The adoption of these Revised
Statutes shall not affect the continued existence and operation,
subject to the provisions hereof, of any department, agency, or
office heretofore legally established or held, nor any acts done,
any funds established, any rights acquired or accruing, any
taxes or other charges incurred or imposed, any penalties incurred
or imposed, or any judicial proceedings had or commenced prior
to the effective date of these Revised Statutes." (Italics supplied.)
After setting out this provision in his opinion, Justice LeBlanc
concluded, "To ascertain the intent of the Legislature of this
State in adopting the Revised Statutes of 1950 we need go no
further than to read again the language of the provisions just
quoted from Section 16 of Title 1. Concerning the issue presented
in this case, its intention could hardly have been more clearly
expressed than that the Revised Statutes then being adopted
were to govern from the day on which they became effective,
that is May 1, 1950, but all judicial proceedings had or commenced
prior to that date should continue in full force and effect. The
provision operated as a general savings clause which protected
the prosecution which had been initiated on March 1, 1950 in
this case." 5
From the standpoint of logic, Justice LeBlanc's clearly writ-
ten opinion, to which this discussion can add little, follows sound
principles of statutory interpretation. From a practical stand-
point, the true intent of the legislature which enacted the Revised
Statutes has prevailed over an attempt to thwart justice by a
technicality, and a "most mischievous consequence" has been
avoided. 6
The Mathe decision was recently followed in State v. Brad-
ford,6a holding that a prohibition ordinance, adopted pursuant to
the state local option law, was not invalidated by the simultane-
5, 53 So. 2d 802, 806 (La. 1951).
6. St. Louis v. Alexandria, 23 Mo. 483, 509 (1856).
6a. La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 40,474 (Dec. 10, 1951).
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ous repeal and reenactment of that law in the Revised Statutes
of 1950. Again the court quoted and relied upon Section 16 of
Title 1, which "unmistakably disclosed the intent of the Legis-
lature not to disturb the status of any acts or rights exercised
under the laws which are revised." 6b
THEFT OF CATTLE
In State v. Hamlet7 the defendant had been convicted of
theft of eight head of cattle valued at $755.00, in violation of
Article 67 of the Criminal Code.8 The 1950 legislature subse-
quently added a special crime of cattle theft designated as Article
67.1 of the Criminal Code,9 which provided a minimum penalty
of three years imprisonment for any theft of cattle, horses, mules,
sheep or goats. This new statute became effective while the
defendant's motion for a new trial was pending. It was the
defendant's contention, on appeal, that the enactment of the
special cattle theft statute, before his conviction for theft under
the general provisions of Article 67 became final, had the effect
of granting him a legislative pardon since the new statute. con-
tained no saving clause. In rejecting this contention the supreme
court pointed out that the new law was merely an addition to
the general theft article of the Criminal Code, and was not
intended to repeal any of its provisions or limit its scope and
application. In this regard Justice LeBlanc declared, "We take
it that the intention of the Legislature was to make the theft of
the particular species of property described in the Act, the crime
of theft, without regard to the value of such property, leaving
it to the discretion of the prosecuting officers of the State whether
an accused should be prosecuted under its provisions for theft of
that kind of property as distinguished from the [general] theft
of that same kind of property or any other property where the
value of the property is involved." 'o
The supreme court's holding is further bolstered by the gen-
eral provision in Article 4 of the Criminal Code," which grants
the district attorney a discretion to prosecute under either pro-
vision when the offender's conduct is "criminal according to a
general article of this code and also according to a special article
6b. Justice McCaleb, speaking for a unanimous court.
7. 219 La. 278, 52 So. 2d 852 (1951).
8. La. R.S. (1950) 14:67.
9. La. Act 173 of 1950.
10. 52 So. 2d 852, 853 (La. 1951).
11. La. R.S. (1950) 14:4.
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of this code." In view of the fact that the special provision pro-
vides the almost Draconic penalty of not less than three years
imprisonment, regardless .of the value of the animal stolen, it is
entirely conceivable that prosecuting authorities may frequently
choose to prosecute less serious cases of livestock stealing under
the general theft article.
CONSPIRACY-OVERT ACT REQUIREMENT
The Criminal Code contains two general inchoate offense
provisions which apply to all crimes. In both instances comple-
tion of the basic offense is not necessary to criminal liability.
Article 2712 provides for the punishment of one who attempts to
commit a crime. While this offense is highly mental in its compo-
sition, requiring a specific intent to commit the crime, it also
requires that the offender do an act "for the purpose of and
tending directly toward the accomplishment of his object." The
article further specifies that "mere preparation to commit a
crime shall not be sufficient to constitute an attempt ... ." Article
2613 defines the offense of criminal conspiracy as requiring an
"agreement or combination of two or more persons for the spe-
cific purpose of committing any crime . . . ." While a criminal
agreement or combination is the essential characteristic of this
offense, it is further provided that liability does not attach unless
"one or more of such parties does an act in furtherance of the
object of the agreement or combination." This additional require-
ment, which was not found in the common law definition of
criminal conspiracy but has usually been included in modem
conspiracy statutes, was inserted for the purpose of guaranteeing
the genuineness of the alleged conspiracy and of establishing
a point at which criminal liability attached regardless of sub-
sequent change of plans. In State v. D'Ingianni14 the supreme
court recognized and applied the proper distinction between the
overt act requirement of the criminal conspiracy offense, and the
act "tending directly toward the accomplishment" of the crime
which was essential to liability for a criminal attempt. In that
case the indictment charged a conspiracy to defraud an insurance
company by pretending that one of the defendants had been
robbed of his insured jewels. The only overt act alleged in the
bill of information was that the owner of the jewels had been
taken in a car to a point where he was let out with the under-
12. La. R.S. (1950) 14:27.
13. La. R.S. (1950) 14:26.
14. 217 La. 945, 47 So. 2d 731 (1950).
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standing that the parties would represent that he had been
forcibly abducted and robbed. If the charge had been attempted
theft (by seeking to defraud the insurance company), the act
alleged would not have gone beyond the zone of preparation and
would not have established criminal liability. In holding that
the overt act was sufficient to meet the criminal conspiracy phys-
ical act requirement the supreme court stressed the distinction
between the two inchoate offenses, pointing out that the overt
act in a criminal conspiracy need not have the same nearness to
the completion of the offense that is required for an attempt.
Justice McCaleb makes one dictum statement which might
bear a little further analysis. He declares, "any act such as a
visit by one of the parties to his co-conspirators for the purpose
of discussing details might suffice as an overt act to complete a
criminal conspiracy although such an act would be regarded as
merely preparatory in a prosecution for an attempt." 15 This
statement shows that very little is necessary to meet the overt
act requirement of a criminal conspiracy. At the same time the
conference of the conspirators to plan details of the offense, if it
is to be considered as an overt act (which is doubtful), clearly
would have to come after the parties had already agreed upon
their course of criminal action. The case cited16 by Justice
McCaleb for the proposition that a meeting to discuss details
"might suffice as an overt act" was one where the parties had
gone beyond mere conferring and had actually prepared fraudu-
lent income tax returns with the intent to file them.
INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
Under Act 222 of 1928 a breach of representation, warranty
or condition contained in a fire insurance policy cannot be relied
on by the insurer to avoid liability unless the breach exists at the
time of the loss and in fact increases the moral or physical hazard
under the policy. The supreme court has established the principle
that the insurer carries the burden of proving the actual increase
in the moral hazard. The theory it has adopted is that the moral
hazard is greatest when the insured's pecuniary interest is such
15. 217 La. 945, 951, 47 So. 2d 731, 733.
16. United States v. Rachmil, 270 Fed. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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